"SUBJECT," "CITIZEN," "NATIONAL," AND "PERMANENT ALLEGIANCE" MAXIMILIAN KOESSLER t So long as nations retain sovereignty, while persons move or engage in transactions across geographic boundaries, the solution of many legal problems will require concepts hinged on the relation of individuals to governing states.' The purpose of the ensuing discussion is analysis of the key terms involved in determining the international status of persons: "subject," "citizen," "national," and "permanent allegiance."
SUBJECT VERSUS CITIZEN
Before the Declaration of Independence, "subject" and "denizen" 2 were the terms most frequently used in'the United States in connections where "citizen" would now be the proper word. This was the natural usage in what then were British colonies, endowed with all the trimmings of the British legal order. Even after the Declaration of Independence, some states enacted constitutions designating as "subjects" the status which others identified by the term "inhabitants," while still others used "citizens" and "subjects" indiscriminately.' "Subjects" of the United States of America were referred to in the treaties signed by the Continental Congress with France (February 6, 1778) 4 and the Netherlands (October 8, 1782).1 Although the term "citizen" appears as early as 1777 in the Articles of Confederation," the use of "subject" as a synonym did not become obsolete before the enactment of the Federal Constitution (1787), which referred to citizens exclusively, both in relation to the United States and to the several states. 7 This change of usage resulted from an emerging political philosophy which abhorred any tinge of colonialism. 8 The term "subject" was brushed aside as a leftover from the feudal law, 9 where it referred to the vassals of a lord, bound by the duty of allegiance to respect him as their master. 1 0 However, one of the ingredients of the feudal theory of subjection survived: the concept of allegiance still forms a tautological 9. The Revolutionary attitude toward the feudal law is exemplified by the statement "Since the promulgation of Christianity, the two great systems of tyrnnny . . . are the canwn and the feudal law.. . ." HOLLIS (ed.), THE TRUE SENTLIUENor OF A maic.A (1768) 111, 113, ascribed to John Adams by WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911) 334 .
The tendency to abandon feudal concepts in this field was not limited to America. The terms citoyen and cittadino, respectively constituting the French and Italian versions of "citizen," supplanted "subject" in those countries, with the qualifications discussed infra note 45 and related text. In Austria, Untertan, or subject, was replaced by Staatsbuerger (citizen). However, the phrase sujets mixtes (mixed subjects), at least in European technical usage, and probably also in this country, is the preferred designation of the status of pers-ons, with multiple nationality.
10. "Allegiance is the tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the subject . . . the name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic ancestors." I BL. Cosro. *366. See also Calvin's Case, 7 Co. la, Sa (77 Eng. R. 377,382, K. B. 1608) where it is said with reference to Glanville that "as between the Sovereign and subject there is duplex et reciprocurn ligamten; quia sid subdittis regi tencur ad obedientian, ita rex subdito tenetur ad protectionen. . . ." Follows then the famous passage: "Therefore it is truly said that proectio traiit subjectionem, ct subjccio protectionem." And see DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Keith's 5th ed. 1932) 896-7; BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (3d ed. 1942) 3-4.
The orthodox theory of the reciprocal connection between allegiance and protection, although of doubtful reasoning, is vindicated in the otherwise startling doctrine enunciated in the treason case against "Lord Haw-Haw," Rex v. Joyce, 62 T. L. R. 57 (Ct. Cr. App. 1945); (1946) 46 COL. L. REv. 319. part " of our statutory definition of nationality.
12
The term "citizen" supplanted "subject" in this country and others, although not in Great Britain," by a process of lexicographic delineation. Even in the period immediately before the American Revolution, there was no such difference in connotation between "subject" and "citizen" as would predicate reserving the status of "citizen" to the people of a republic and "subject" to those under the sovereignty of a monarch. Distinguished French lawyers, writing during the ancielt regime, seem to have found nothing preposterous in their occasional use of the term "citizen" with regard to the most absolutistically ruled subjects of the King of France.
14 During the middle ages, "citizens" lived in towns, and so were members of communities exempted from the then almost ubiquitous feudal system. 1' But, when the medieval system of government was replaced by the principles of territorial state sovereignty, "subject" and "citizen" came to be used as synonyms, at least by such eminent writers as Bodin 1' and Grotius, 7 although 11. In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 673 (1944) , Mr. Justice Frankfurter, per curiam, after citing Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943) , and similar cases, announced:
"Allegiance to this government and its laws, is a compendious phrase to describe those political and legal institutions that are the enduring features of American political society. We are here dealing with a test expressing a broad conception -a breadth appropriate to the nature of the subject matter, being nothing less than the bonds that tie Americans together in devotion to a common fealty." And see note 68 infra.
12. Sec. 101(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1137, 8 U. S. C. § 501 (1940) reads: "The term 'national' means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state." Sec. 101 (b) elucidates: "The term 'national of the United States' means (1) a citizen of the United States, or (2) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States. It does not include an alien." The final phrase is cryptic, If "alien" means one who is not a national, the phrase is surplusage. If "alien" means one who is not a citizen, it is inconsistent with the fact that the Act establishes the possibility of nationality without citizenship. Quaere: Is there any third way of understanding that phrase?
13. " 'British subject' is an inclusive term, denoting all subjects of His Britannic Majesty, to whatever part of the Commonwealth they may belong. The term 'citizen' Is applied to a person in respect of whom a particular member of the Commonwealth claims jurisdiction." STEWART Spinoza's abstractions remained without direct practical effect, until a passage in Rousseau's Social Contract, adapting and somewhat coloring, but not quoting, Spinoza's proposition, 21 proided the stimulus which made "citizens" the terminology for a self-governing people. 2 An English version of the passage reads, "With regard to the associates, they take collectively the name of People, and are individually called Citizens, as participating in the sovereign power, and Subjects, as subjected to the laws of the state." 23
NATIONALITY AS THE STATUS OF BELONGING TO A STATE
"Nationality" is a young word. Its matrix, the French nationalit6, appeared for the first time in the 1835 edition of the Diclionnaire de l'Acadmie Frangaise. 24 It has at least two accepted denotations: (1) the status of belonging to a state; (2) the quality of membership in an ethnological group. 5 Nationality in the sense of belonging to a state ELEMENTA PHILOSOPHICA DE CIvE (1646) c. 5, § 6, says (writer's translation), "Each citizen, as well as each dependent corporation, is in relation to the holder of the sovereignty called a subject." Even a century later, VATTEL, LE DROIT DEs GENS (1758) Bk. 2, c. 8, § 107; Bk. 3, c. 1, § 8 used "citizen" and "subject" as synonyms. 25. This duality of meaning derives from the parent-word, "nation." Contrast the answers to the question "What is a Nation?" The French Revolutionist, Abb6 Siey s, as quoted by SULZBACH, NATIONAL CoNscIous,',msS (1943) 63, answered, "A body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature." He obviously pointed to statehood. RENAN, QU'EST-CE QU'UNE NATION? (1882) 27, suggested (writer's is a primarily legal concept, the existence of which in a certain person will be determined by such extrinsic tests as the applicable law prescribes. Nationality, ethnologically, while essentially a sociological conception with political implications, 2 " may occasionally have a palpable legal effect.Y Determination of ethnological nationality in a given case may be a touchy matter, since the standards are not universally recognized and are, at least partly, subjective rather than objective.
PUFENDORF, ELEMEN'TORU
In its legal sense, the term "national" is often used as a general designation irrespective of whether the status of belonging to a state is examined with a view to certain rights and'(or) duties under international law, or is looked upon as the basis of rights and duties, effective within the domestic sphere of a state. However, the trend is to reserve the term "national" for the designation of that status by virtue (1934) 81-2], ethnological groups in the Austrian Empire were supposed to receive equal treatment in certain specified respects. Under Art. 80 of the peace treaty of St. Germain, the right of option among the succession-states of the Austrian monarchy depended to a measurable extent upon the ethnological quality of the optant. Again, in the case of modern forced exchange of populations, the "nationality" of a person carries radical legal consequences. According to Art, 2 of tile German decree on the "Protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia, March 16, 1939, the inhabitants of, the Protectorate, who theretofore were Czechoslovakian citizens, became citizens of the Reich, if they were of German "nationality," otherwise citizens of the Protectorate. [Vol, 56: 58 of which a person, internationally, belongs to a certain state, and to speak of "citizenship" when the local status referred to is one of domestic rather than international law.
CITIZENSHIP VERSUS NATIONALITY "Citizenship," in modem usage, is not a synonym of nationality or a term generally used for the status of belonging to a state, but means specifically the possession by the person under consideration, of the highest or at least of a certain higher category of political rights and (or) duties, established by the nation's or state's constitution. This conception, substantially amounting to a modem revival of an Aristotelian formulation, is defined by Moore: "Citizenship, strictly speaking, is a term of municipal law, and denotes the possession within the particular state of full civil and political rights, subject to special disqualifications, such as minority or sex. The conditions on which citizenship is acquired are regulated by municipal law." 2. However, since the list of the concrete rights and duties, that constitute "citizenship" in this specific sense, differs according to the country in question, it has also been said, ". . [There is no universal definition of citizenship when citizenship ceases to be synonymous with nationality." 0
Applications of "citizen" in the narrower sense, along the lines of Moore's definition, have occurred chiefly in connections where domestic status of nationals vary. The Mexican law apparently considers such special disqualifications as are inherent in minority as inconsistent with the concept of citizenship as distinguished from nationality.O In the United States there has been an issue as to whether the so-called "alien-vote," which for a time existed in certain states, 31 was tanta- been finally decided in the negative. 32 A similar dispute arose with regard to a somewhat reverse proposition, namely, that since women may be citizens in this country, they should as such be entitled to the suffrage. While the Supreme Court of the United States decided in the negative, 33 an amendment to the federal constitution satisfied the claim of the feminists.
34
The first precedent in the line of republican constitutions which used the term "citizen" substantially in the narrower sense, seems to be represented by the French constitutions of 1793, 1795 and 1799,11 which, in contrast to the French constitution of 1791, distinguished between a Frangais generally and a citoyen. The latter term designated the Frenchman who possessed the qualifications prerequisite to the vote. 3 " Citizenship in this sense was also mentioned in the original Code Napol~on 37 For a time during the nineteenth century, there was a tendency in France to distinguish between two kinds of naturalization. Grande naturalisation conferred the legal position of a citoyen; petite naturalisation made the former alien a Frenchman without the right to vote. 6 In this country, limited distinctions exist between the status of born and naturalized citizens in that only a born citizen may become President 19 or Vice-President 40 of the United States, while a naturalized citizen may expatriate himself by extended residence abroad. 4 37. Prior to the amendment of 1889, Art. 8 referred simply to a Frenchman (Frangais), while Art. 7 referred to the capacity of a citizen (qualit6 de citoyen), and provided that the exercise of civil rights should be independent therefrom. In view of the influence of French law upon the legal developments in Latin-American countries, it is fair to assume that constitutional provisions in those countries which employ the term "citizen" in a narrower sense may be traced to the French constitutions. An application of political ethics not to be confounded with racial discrimination is a gradation of nationality employed by a country standing on a high level of civilization, which attaches to its sovereignty a territory with a backward population, to avoid granting the latter a full share in the self-government of the former. 4 " For this reason nationality should not be confused with revocation of nationality under 8 U. S. C. § 73S, where naturalization was fraudulently procured. By § 738c, removal abroad within five years of naturalization is prima facie evidence of a lack of intention, at the time of naturalization, to become a permanent citizen of the United States.
The constitutionality of the current provisions for loss of nationality has not been France and Italy distinguish between a citizen and a colonial subject. 4 5
The Nationality Act of 1940 sanctions the distinction between American nationality, including American citizenship, and American nationality, devoid of American citizenship. 4 In terms of this statute, American citizenship embraces in addition to those privileges and (or) duties which are inherent in American nationality, such as the possibility of diplomatic protection by the United States 41 and the body of obligations customarily referred to as "permanent allegiance," 41 the existence of those rights which only a "citizen" enjoys under the Constitution. However, even recent legislation occasionally uses the term "citizen" in a wider sense embracing any American national 652, 668, 677 (1945 The prevailing opinion seems to be that declarant aliens are not American nationals, since it has been settled that they are not within this country's diplomatic protection," 6 and those anomalies which previously singled out their conditions from that of other aliens no longer exist.
PERmA _NT ALLEGIANCE
Reference to a duty of "permanent allegiance" is not a happy way of defining nationality in the sense of a status under international law. Such a definition envisions a specific distinction between the "permanent" relation of nationality and the "temporary allegiance" 5 7 required of resident aliens, 5 and so keeps alive the largely-abandoned maxim "'once a subject, always a subject." 11 However, a national can now generally expatriate himself, at least by naturalization in another The term "allegiance" in itself has become archaic. In its feudal setting, "allegiance" denoted a reciprocal correlation of interconnected rights and duties. But in modem states the obligations of the national to the nation are unconditional, rather than contingent upon the state's compliance with corresponding duties. Only in isolated instances do modem writers consider the relation between the national and his state as contractual. 65 Furthermore, the national of a state is generally not entitled to claim protection as a matter of right. The state has a right, as against other states, to exercise diplomatic protection in his behalf, but not a duty toward the national." In this country [Vol, 56: 58a definite practice has been established that in certain typical situations diplomatic protection should normally be denied in spite of the American nationality of the applicant.
7
Deprived of one of the essential ingredients which went into its feudal meaning, namely of the subject's right to claim his lord's protection, and also minus the whole general background of the one-time feudal society, "permanent allegiance," referred to in a modem definition of nationality, cannot be more than a synonym for "nationality." c3 It has become a mystic concept which dims, instead of clarifying, definitions. Most people have a working knowledge of the meaning of "nationality," but even scholars are at a loss to explain "allegiance." Characteristically, the Harvard Research on Nationality suggests defining nationality as "the status of a natural person who is attached to the state by the tie of allegiance," 11 and then muddies the picture by saying:
"No attempt is made in this draft to define the meaning of allegiance. It may be observed, however, that the 'tie of allegiance' is a term in general use to denote the sum of the obligations of a natural person to the state to which he belongs. The draft itself does not spell out these obligations, since they are quite different in different societies." 70 It seems desirable to eliminate "allegiance" from any technical use and redefine "nationality" in plain words meaning the status of belonging to a state for certain purposes of international law.
'

THm DUAL NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Another source of confusion in defining nationality is the concept that state sovereignty is personal as well as territorial. 72 The right-duty 67. SECxLER-HuDsON, STATELESSNESS (1934) 17. 68. Under this assumption, definitions of nationality, which explain the latter by referring to "permanent allegiance," are tautological, as suggested supra, p. 000. But they are, in this respect, not worse than some definitions not referring to "allegiance." See, e.g., 1 PIGGOTT, NATIONALITY (1907) relationship between states, with respect to a national of one, is a function of the personal sovereignty of the state over its nationals. However, the distinctions between personal and territorial sovereignty are flexible and not clearly delineated, 7 3 so that this concept does not contribute to defining nationality as an aggregate of specified rights and (or) duties.
NATIONALITY AS A FORMAL CATEGORY Nationality is a formal legal category, consisting in a person's status of belonging to a state. 7 4 Error seems inherent in any attempt to define the conception by reference to "allegiance" or to any other specific right-duty relationship, 75 inasmuch as rights and (or) duties which are attributed to the status of national, 7 whether by international or domestic law, will vary geographically and temporally. The concept of nationality is no more than a formal frame, surrounding a picture of changeable character.
77
For example, the most conspicuous international function of the nationality concept is the right of a state to extend protection to its nationals abroad. 7 8 In exceptional cases a state is permitted to exercise protection over individuals not its nationals, 7 or, conversely, it may be excluded from the right to protect those of its nationals who belong 73. How far a given state intends to stretch its personal jurisdiction or sovereignty with regard to nationals abroad is a matter of domestic law; whether its respective claim is justified, in relation to other states, is a matter of international law. 75. This is one of the errors in Lessing's definition of nationality as the relation between an individual and a state by virtue of which the latter is entitled to protect the former abroad, and is bound, in addition, to permit his residence on its territory, with the resulting prohibition of banishment of a national from the whole national territory and the resulting duty of receiving back a national deported from a foreign state. LESSINO, op. cil. supra note 28, at 148.
76. Nationality, as distinguished from citizenship (in the narrower sense referred to supra, p. 63.) though primarily a conception with an international function, is often borrowed as a convenient attachment for certain strictly domestic purposes, as in statutory provisions making nationality a requirement for admission to certain public offices or quasipublic or even private professions. LESSING, op. cit. supra note 28, at 148, n. 2, in this connection speaks of an "accessory" (i.e., "secondary") effect of nationality.
77. JELLINEK, SYSTEM DER SUBJERTIVEN OEFFENTLICiEN REcIiTE (1905) 117, 78. "One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships, recognized immemorially as a responsibility of government, has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country's own nationals when those nationals are in another country." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 64 (1941) .
79. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht's 5th ed. 1937) 514 et seq.
to a particular category.So But normally it is only through the intervention of the state of their nationality that private persons are able to obtain redress against injuries inflicted upon them by a foreign state in violation of international law. 8 ' However, there is a trend toward permitting private persons to raise international claims without the intermediate agency of a state. 8 1 2 Materialization of this proposition would render the institution of diplomatic protection obsolete, if not formally abolished. But nationality would remain a living concept as long as any legal consequences are attached to the status of belonging to a state.
As a further example, it is sometimes said-either unconditionally or with qualifications-that a country is prevented by international law from forcing military service upon nationals of another state. The validity of this statement appears doubtful, in view of numerous and important precedents to the contrary. 83 Assuming a restatement to harmonize international law with the practice of states which draft certain categories of aliens, nationality, though no longer impl5ing the national's exemption from military service for a foreign state, would retain conceptual utility.
INTERNATIONAL FUNCTION OF THE NATIONALITY STATUS VERSUS ITS DOAIESTIC DETERmIINATION
According to the principle of the donmaine r~sert,6, the acquisition and loss of nationality is determined by domestic rather than by international law. 4 Of the numerous complications 85 that may result from this principle, the most important revolve around the "man without a country" 86 and the sujet mixteY These anomalies are frequently caused by divergence between the jus soli and the jus sanguinis," concurrently applicable to the same individual, pursuant to the principle of reserved domain, which in this respect would seem to become selfdefeating. For example, an individual born in a country applying jus sanguinis, of parents who are nationals of a country applying jus soli would acquire neither the nationality of his country of birth nor the nationality of his parents, but be born as a stateless person. UND VOELKERRECUT 184, 196 , suggests that it would have been against international law should Great Britain, in her Naturalization Act of 1870, have conferred British nationality upon all persons speaking English as their native tongue. He even ventures to guess that such legislation would have been followed by a declaration of war by the United States.
86. "Man without a country," as used here, means a technically stateless person, and not one in the situation of the central figure in Edward E. Hale's story "The Man Without A Country" (1863). See SECKLER-HuDSON, STATELESSNESS (1934) .
87. See note 9 supra and SCHWARZENBERGER, op. cit. supra note 27, at 151.
88. Roughly described, jus soli attaches the nationality status to the fact of being born in a country, jus sanguinis to the fact of being the son of a national. In this country, and some others, a mixed system prevails, as appears from an inspection of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1137 (1940) , 8 U. S. C. § 501.
[Vol. 56:5$8 still sticks to the old rule "once a subject always a subject," while the naturalization practice of the other disregards that maximP3
The domaine rgserzv principle in matters of nationality law also implies that whenever, by international custom or treaty, certain rights or duties of a state with regard to a given individual flow from the latter's condition of belonging to that state, a different category of people will be included according to whether the domestic rules concerning acquisition of nationality are governed by the jus soli or the jus sanguinis.
Qualifications of the domestic domain principle have been created by way of bilateral as well as multilateral treaties." 0 The existence of qualifications other than treaty provisions, has been alleged by various sources, but always in a vague language which does not represent a workable rule of practice. 9 ' Disregard of the principle in cases where its practical consequences would be absurd could be technically justified by recourse to the public policy clause or ordre public exception, which appears to be applicable beyond the sphere of the conflict of laws in the domestic field.
9 2 A similar line of approach is suggested by those who point to the legal reaction against abuses of the right of sovereignty. Recently, an author even went to the extreme of submitting a rather casuistic list of types of attachment which, he believes, are the factual substratum required by customary international law, as a condition for the validity of domestic law conferring the respective state's nationality upon a given category of individuals. Lessing, Los Momentos De Conexi6n En El Derecho De Naciondidad,(1942) 
1946]
a foreign municipal law under which a self-exile, in spite of his own declared intention to the contrary, 94 would retain his nationality of origin. 9 5 Moreover, there have been cases where an individual, who had lost the nationality of a state under the latter's domestic law, was by a foreign court still considered its national," Similarly, the Expatriation Act of the United States of July 27, 1868,11 seems to announce the principle that this country will disregard any foreign nationality law under which an individual, irrespective of his American naturalization, still retains his nationality of origin."
A general exception to the rule of domestic domain in matters of nationality law is represented by the prohibition of compulsory naturalization, which, according to textual authority, forms part of the prevailing customary international law. This prohibition means that no state is allowed to confer its nationality upon the nationals of another state, unless the individual himself asks for such a change of his status. 9 Reference may, in this connection, be made to the protests which the United States in several instances raised against Latin-American laws that had introduced automatic naturalization of certain classes of 94. For a comparative law study of the problem of renunciation or waiver of nationality see, OTTEN, DER VERSICUT AUF DIE STAATSANGEH6RIGKEIT (1934) . "Expatriation" has been defined as "the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance." Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 334 (1939) . However, the normal usage of "expatriation" would seem to indicate loss of original nationality through naturalization In another country. (1884) it was said that the Act of July 27, 1868, affirmed "the right of every man to expatriate himself from one country." The Act was intended primarily as a declaration of the position of this Government toward foreign-born persons who should have obtained naturalization as citizens of tile United States, and thus made it clear that this Government no longer recognized the ancient feudal principle of indissoluble allegiance. Its language, however, appears to be broad enough to include not only the reverse picture, (i.e., an American who obtains naturalization in foreign country) but also the case of a person expatriating himself from his country of origin, without simultaneously acquiring a new nationality, but rather with a view to becoming stateless. But no authority exists covering such an extended application of the [Vol. 56: 58 aliens. The affected countries gradually eliminated those offensive statutory provisions.' Customary international law has not yet developed an exception with regard to the population of a territory voluntarily or involuntarily changing its sovereign.' 0 t This general proposition is probably true also in the case of individuals who at the time of a foreign annexation of their home territory are residing abroad and thereupon remain abroad permanently.
1 2 The right of option, though often granted in treaties concerning cession of territories, is not established by customary international law.' 0 3
No exception from the principle of reserved domain is represented by the fact that, especially in modern times, the practice of enemy alien treatment very often disregards formal nationality, by generally exempting from that treatment certain categories of technically enemy, but really friendly, aliens, 1 4 and on the other hand subjecting to an extraordinary regime categories of nationals who are not trusted with regard to their loyalty. 05 In these cases it is not the domestic domain principle, but nationality itself which ceases to be a dominant factor.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to show that "nationality," as a conception of international law, does not mean any specific rights and (or) duties, nor an aggregate of either or of both,"' 6 but is a purely formal proposition. It designates the status of a person's belonging to a state, with particular reference to international relations among states concerning this person. In a world divided into states it is the function of the nationality concept to apportion the global population among the several nations." 7 Each state has both a territorial and a personal sovereignty. 0 I The "nationals" of a state are those who arq under its personal sovereignty, that is attached td it irrespective of the fact of their physical presence at a given moment." 9 In a world without states (or if the "Cardenas doctrine" 110 were accepted as established international law) the nationality conception would lose its above-defined present meaning."' But a realistically anticipated future world will not be able to do away with the legal concept of nationality, though it may be expected that specific rules of international law will assume paramount importance among the factors determining the acquisition or loss of nationality, thus depriving the domestic domain principle of its present controlling importance. It would also seem to be no unreasonable guess that domicile rather than birthplace or filiation may in the future be the favorite fact of attachment for the acquisition of nationality. 112
